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Hungary has established a specific control system for public procurements funded from EU 
funds. The  necessity to conform to the  requirements of the  control body as well as public 
procurement legislation often causes delays and affects the decisions of public authorities. 
The aim of the article is to show how the controls related to EU funded public procurements 
work in Hungary and to see how it might affect public authorities. The article introduces 
the features of the system and provides an analysis of data from the relevant bodies to see 
the challenges related to the control system.
The results show that even though there seems to be some positive impact on the regularity 
of procedures, the delays and the interference in the decisions of contracting authorities is 
problematic. It would be advisable to streamline the control process such as through checks 
based on samples or focusing on the riskiest procedures.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When purchasing goods and services, bodies belonging to the public administration (the 
so called ‘contracting authorities’) must use a public procurement procedure. This is often 
a  long and complex process, which is a  major challenge for public authorities. In case 
the procedure provided in the public procurement legislation1 is not followed, remedies 
may be sought before the national review bodies where damages can be awarded or even 
the  contract may be declared ineffective. Public procurement receives special attention 
in the context of EU funded projects, since an incorrect application of the rules can lead 
to a finding of irregularities and therefore financial corrections, through which funding 
is withdrawn from a project.2 The use of EU funds is monitored by a number of bodies 
including the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and national audit 
authorities. In order to avoid public procurement irregularities, it is useful to establish 
additional control systems at national level.
Hungary has established a specific control system for public procurements funded from 
EU funds. While all EU Member States are obliged to have adequate systems of supervision 
and control, we are not aware of another EU country which controls procedures on such 
a large scale. The Hungarian control body controls documents and procedures both ex ante 
and during the procedure itself for all EU funded procurements above the EU thresholds 
for goods and services and above HUF 300 million (approx. EUR 1 million) for works 
contracts.3 In addition, ex post controls exist for all procedures below these values.
The main aim of this article is to show the functioning of the Hungarian control system 
and to investigate how impacts the procurements of contracting authorities. We provide 
both a theoretical analysis of the difficulties related to the control system and data received 
from the control body is also analysed to estimate how contracting authorities might be 
affected by the  controls. Our hypothesis is that public authorities take more care when 
carrying out public procurement, although this, and the length of the control process itself 
is likely to cause delays in the process. Further, if the procurement is not prepared with due 
care, then this can result in even more interruptions in the process due to several calls for 
missing documents by the control body or a refusal to grant a green light for the process. 
While little reference can be found in the academic literature to such an analysis of control 
1 Public procurement in the EU is governed by the public procurement directives, i.e. Directive 2014/23/EU, 
Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU. These provide the  basis for national public procurement 
legislation in all EU Member States.
2 European Commission, Decision of 19.12.2013 on the setting out and approval of the guidelines for determining 
financial corrections to be made by the Commission to expenditure financed by the Union under shared manage-
ment, for non-compliance with the rules on public procurement. C(2013) 9527 final.
3 The general EU threshold for goods and services is EUR 144,000 for central government authorities, EUR 
221,000 for other contracting authorities and EUR 5,548,000 for works contracts. A separate control system 
exists for certain public procurements funded from purely national funds, but this article focuses on EU 
funded public procurements.
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systems of other countries, a brief mention will also be made of the types of controls that 
exist elsewhere.
2. SUMMARY OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES IN THE EU
Conducting a  public procurement procedure in accordance with the  EU rules involves 
a number of decisions and lots of preparation. Preparation and planning are critical and will 
influence all future activity on the contract. However, it is often the case that the contracting 
authority either underestimates the planning stage of the process or does not carry it out 
at all.4 The most significant decision that has to be made during the preparation process 
is the “decision on what to purchase”. Here the contracting authority must choose what 
goods, services or works it wishes to purchase in order to fulfil its needs. While the Public 
Procurement Directives do not impose restrictions on “what to buy”, in fact for EU funded 
projects there are restrictions imposed by EU legislation in form of the so called eligible 
costs. So, for the eligibility part, the contracting authority who is a beneficiary of EU funds 
must carefully select the goods, service or works it wishes to buy from the funds awarded 
to it.
Once the contracting authority has decided what it wishes to purchase, it must be decided 
how the purchase is going to be made, i.e. whether a public procurement is necessary. Any 
purchase will have to be made by means of a formal public procurement procedure, as long 
as the estimated value of the procurement exceeds the thresholds set out in the Directives 
(or the  corresponding national legislation). At the  same time the  contracting authority 
should also check whether any exceptions5 in the Directive can be applied.
If the contracting authority makes a purchase in relation to which a public procurement 
procedure is necessary, the  procedure has to be planned very carefully. All necessary 
information has to be set out in the procurement documents, which will have to be made 
available to all the potential tenderers interested in the contract.
An important feature of the procurement is the definition of technical specifications which 
is a detailed description of the product, service or work to be purchased. Where possible, 
specifications should be defined in terms of performance or functional requirements and if 
standards or in exceptional cases specific makes or sources are referred to, the description 
must use the words “or equivalent”.
The contracting authority must also choose the most appropriate procedure for con-
ducting the  procurement. According to the  EU rules, open and restricted procedures 
can always be used, while other types (competitive procedure with negotiation, competi-
tive dialogue and negotiated procedure without publication of notice) are subject to strict 
conditions.
4 European Union, Public Procurement – Guidance for Practitioners on the avoidance of the most common errors 
in projects funded by the European Structural and Investment Funds, Brussels, 2015. 11.
5 E.g. in-house procurement, research and development services etc.
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It is also important for the contracting authority to decide what selection criteria and 
award criteria it wishes to apply during the  procedure. It may also set conditions for 
the performance of the contract, which, according to the Directives, may include economic, 
innovation-related, environmental, social or employment-related considerations.
Once the  procurement documents have been prepared and tenders (or requests to 
participate) have been submitted, a series of decisions have to be made during the conduct 
of the procedure. First the contracting authority must establish whether the  tenders (or 
requests to participate) conform to the conditions set out in the procurement documents 
and the public procurement rules. If some documents have not been submitted, a request 
for the supply of missing information should be issued to the tenderers concerned. Under 
this principle only minor errors may be corrected and any change must not affect any 
feature of the offer which is evaluated under the award criteria.
Probably the  most important decision that a  contracting authority has to make is to 
whom the contract should be awarded. This must be based on the evaluation of tenders on 
the basis of the award criteria set out in the procurement documents. In case only numerical 
criteria are used (e.g. price and/or cost only) then the selection of the winner will essentially 
be automatic, based on the tenders submitted. However, if other criteria are used aiming 
to evaluate the best price–quality ratio (e.g. aesthetic characteristics, quality of staff, etc.), 
then the contracting authority does have a certain amount of discretion in the evaluation 
of these aspects. Nevertheless, this discretion is again limited by the principles of equal 
treatment and transparency, which are subject to the  control mechanisms described in 
section 3.
Finally, decision whether, after its signature, the  contract should be modified, is also 
strictly limited by the Public Procurement Directives. Modifications without assessment 
of the  strictly defined conditions are inter alia possible where the  so called de minimis 
conditions are fulfilled: where the  value of the  modification is below the  EU threshold 
values, and 10% of the initial contract value for service and supply contracts and below 15% 
of the initial contract value for works contracts. In addition, the modification may not alter 
the overall nature of the contract.
3. THE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
3.1. The functions of the control system
In general, efficient enforcement is of utmost importance for compliance with the rules in 
any field of law, including public procurement.6 The EU obliges all Member States to have 
an effective remedies system in order to increase compliance with the rules. However, this 
6 Ed. Sue Arrowsmith: EU Public Procurement Law: An Introduction, Asia-Link Project, Nottingham, 2011. 
288.
148
ta
nu
lm
án
yo
k •
G YÖRG Y I N Y I KO S –  G Á B OR S O Ó S •  PU BL IC PRO C U R E M E N T C ON T ROL S I N H U N G A RY
is not always thought to be sufficient, since applying for remedies might be a costly and 
burdensome exercise and not all interested parties might be willing to start a case before 
the competent review bodies. So most EU Member States have decided to set up additional 
control systems to increase compliance with the legislation on public procurement.
The control processes receive special attention in the  context of EU funds, due to 
the severe sanctions and the possible loss of funding. The statistics also show that public 
procurement is a risky area in the context of using EU funds. In fact, when spending EU 
funds, public procurement is the area most affected by irregularities in the EU Member 
States. According to the experience of audits, the infringement of the public procurement 
rules was the most significant type of irregularity that occurred during the implementation 
of the  EU cohesion funds over the  2009–2013 period.7 According to a  system audit of 
the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in 2011, 44% of quantifiable errors were related 
to public procurement.8 These infringements can have serious consequences. If a breach 
of the rules is found, then the European Commission (or the Member State authorities) 
may impose financial corrections, meaning that the EU financial support from the project 
is partially or totally withdrawn. In addition, if the public procurement system does not 
function properly, payment of funds may also be suspended, causing potential delays in 
the necessary payments to be made.
Public procurement procedures also involve a  quite high corruption risk. This partly 
comes from the  fact that large sums are available from EU funds and there is some 
discretion on how to allocate funding. A  study involving the  Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary revealed that when additional public resources became available for 
discretionary allocation, there was a considerable increase of corruption but this could be 
counter-balanced by a more stringent regulation, monitoring and transparency.9 The risk 
of corruption involving EU funds is also an issue in other countries such as Romania, 
which also has a  large share of EU funds in its public spending.10 Beyond the European 
context, in the American literature we can also find reference to the importance of internal 
controls to fight procurement fraud.11
Strict controls of EU funded public procurement have the aim of ensuring the  lawful 
spending of funds and avoiding the  loss of funding from the  EU through changing 
the attitudes and behaviour of public authorities. If funds are withdrawn, then the burden 
of paying for the projects in question will fall exclusively on the national budgets. While 
changing the behaviour of authorities is a key element to success, it is also important to 
7 ECA (2015): op. cit. 8.
8 ECA, European Court of Auditors Annual Report concerning the financial year 2011.
9 Fazekas Mihály, Jana Chvalkovska, Jiri Skuhrovec, Tóth János István, Lawrence Peter King: Are EU funds 
a corruption risk? The impact of EU funds on grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe, Working Paper 
series: CRCB-WP/2013:03, GTI-WP/2013:03. Budapest, 2013. 20.
10 Valentina Dimulescu, Raluca Pop, Irina Madalina Doroftei: Risks of corruption and the management of EU 
funds in Romania, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 13(2013)/1. 101–123.
11 Rene G. Rendon, Juanita M. Rendon: Auditability in public procurement: An analysis of internal controls and 
fraud vulnerability, Int. J. Procurement Management, 8(2015)/6. 710–730.
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design the control process in a way that does not constitute an excessive burden for public 
authorities that receive EU funds. In particular, the delays, the administrative burdens and 
the autonomy of the decision-making should be minimised. Nevertheless, our hypothesis 
is that a  “fear” of being controlled will always change the  way in which the  controlled 
entities behave. In an ideal situation they will ensure that their procurement decisions are 
always in conformity with the public procurement rules and therefore auditors will not 
find any irregularities in the procurement processes. Furthermore, strict control can also 
cause them to be very careful in the application of the rules, leading to a situation where 
they do not carry out their procurement in the  most official and optimal way, but use 
procedures and criteria which surely conform to the relevant legislation.
3.2. Controls in other EU Member States
The amount of literature on the  control systems of other countries is fairly scarce. 
However, from the  information available it can be established that they tend to be less 
comprehensive than the Hungarian system. A detailed comparative study has been carried 
out for the Public Procurement Network12 which can offer an insight into the institutional 
system of EU Member States, including the authorities responsible for the supervision of 
public procurements. According to the study, a number of countries, such as Italy, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece and Spain appoint their national court of auditors to control 
the legality of public procurement procedures. In other countries the role of supervision 
and control is carried out by specialised bodies that belong to the government structure 
(Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Malta). In Slovenia, audits are carried out by 
the National Review Commission whose members are nominated by Parliament. In some 
countries the  supervision of public procurements belongs to the  national competition 
authority, which is the case in the Czech Republic, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and 
Denmark. In Greece, controls are carried out before the  conclusion of the  contract by 
the National Court of Auditors for contracts above EUR 1 million. In Italy an independent 
body, the Authority for the Supervision of Public Contracts has been set up.
In Poland the  main controller of procurement procedures compliance is the  Public 
Procurement Orders Agency, which carries out scheduled and unscheduled documentary 
inspections of procurement at the  request of state bodies, public organizations and 
citizens and analyses information in the  procurement bulletin. Procurements that are 
financed or co-financed by EU funds, equal to or exceeding EUR 10 million in respect of 
the procurement of goods and services and EUR 20 million in case of works are subject to 
mandatory control.13 Further, a good example of a country taking steps to fight corruption 
in public procurement is Malta, which has also established a system investigating fraud 
and corruption in public procurement, where after receiving any form of reporting 
12 Bianchi, Guidi: op. cit.
13 Sergiy Yaremenko, Olexandr Shatkoviskiy: The Control of Public Procurement – Polish Experience Relevant 
to Ukraine, Source: http://eupublicprocurement.org.ua>, (accessed 06.05.2018).
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concerning fraudulent activities in public procurement, the Director of Contracts, after 
having conducted his own investigations, can forward reports and findings to the Police 
Commissioner or the Internal Audit and Investigations Department.14
The most interesting fact about the  supervisory bodies in other EU Member States is 
that unlike in the Hungarian case, their controls are based on a sample of procurements 
and in some cases they are based on complaints, so generally they do not control every 
single procedure. In Sweden for example priority is given to cases where the  authority 
thinks that their actions will have the desired effect.15 The Finnish authority also seeks to 
focus on the essential issues and avoids inflexible and prolonged procedures.16 Generally 
the approach of countries other than Hungary is that no prior consent of the control body 
is required to launch the procedure or to award and conclude the contract. For example 
in case of Poland, the Public Procurement Orders Agency may make recommendations, 
turn to the review body or fine the contracting authority.17 As described above, mandatory 
ex ante controls do also exist in Poland, however, their thresholds are much higher 
than in case of Hungary. It should also be reiterated that controls of national courts of 
auditors generally close with a report stating the evaluation of the controlled activities and 
containing recommendations on how to address these,18 but they do not give their consent 
to the launch of procedures.
For monitoring the  correct use of EU funds, Hungary has opted for a  strict control 
system, which has various elements of ex ante, ex post control and control integrated in 
the process. This is supplemented by the mandatory remedies system required by EU law,19 
other checks by national audit authorities and the control of public procurement notices 
by the Public Procurement Authority. The key feature of the system is that practically all 
EU funded public procurement procedures are subject to the mandatory control process. 
The  main Hungarian body responsible for the  control of public procurements funded 
from EU funds is the Department for Public Procurement Control (DPPC) of the Prime 
Minister’s Office. Lower value procurements are controlled by the competent Managing 
Authority (authority responsible for selecting beneficiaries of EU funds). The  control 
system is described below in more detail.
14 Department of Contracts, Addressing Fraud and Corruption in Public Procurement, Ministry of Finance of Mal-
ta, May 2017.
15 SCA, The Swedish Competition Authority’s supervision over public procurement, Adm no. 119/2016.
16 FCCA, Supervision of public procurement. Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority, 2017. Source: 
<https://www.kkv.fi/en/facts-and-advice/competition-affairs/supervision-of-public-procurement> (accessed 
06.05.2018).
17 Yaremenko, Shatkoviskiy: op. cit.
18 Jacek Mazur: A lengyel számvevőszék hozzájárulása a jogalkotáshoz és más legfőbb ellenőrző intézmények ta-
pasztalatai, Pénzügyi Szemle, 61(2016)/3. 349–366.
19 Directive 89/665/EEC on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (as amended by 
Directive 2007/66/EC).
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3.3. Ex ante controls20
In Hungary, ex ante controls are carried out by the DPPC for public supply contracts, public 
service contracts and public service concessions reaching or exceeding the EU thresholds 
and for public works contracts and public works concessions reaching or exceeding HUF 
300 million (approx. EUR 1 million). In this control process both the competent Managing 
Authority and the DPPC are involved.
As a first step the beneficiary (contracting authority) must send the procurement docu-
ments to the Managing Authority who will check the eligibility, accountability and tech-
nical aspects of the procurement within 5 working days. The contracting authority must 
modify the  documents, if necessary, in accordance with the  comments of the  Mana-
ging Authority. Then the  contracting authority sends the  procurement documents to 
the  DPPC  for ex ante control. Control by the  DPPC is carried out in two stages. First 
the DPPC checks whether exclusion criteria, selection criteria, award criteria, contract per-
formance conditions and securities ensuring contract performance have been defined in 
conformity with the public procurement rules. A certificate on the launching of the proce-
dure is issued within 5 working days. If it is found that some aspect of the procedure does 
not comply with the public procurement rules, then the contract notice or other procure-
ment documents must be amended. When this process is complete, the DPPC will check 
all other public procurement law aspects of the relevant documents within 5 working days. 
During both processes, calls for missing documents may be issued, which can slow down 
the process considerably. Finally, a supportive certificate, a supportive certificate with con-
ditions or a non-supportive certificate is issued with respect to the contract documents. 
In the second case, amendments to the documents must be made, while in the last case 
the documents must be withdrawn.
It must be highlighted that until the  end of 2016, ex ante control was carried out in 
one step and the  contracting authority was prohibited from starting the  procedure 
until a  supportive certificate (conditional or unconditional) was issued by the  DPPC. 
However, the  legislation in force from 1 January 2017 allows the  contracting authority 
to start the procedure at the same time as sending the documents to the DPPC (except 
for accelerated procedures or negotiated procedures without publication of a  notice). 
The  decision to start the  proceedings (i.e. publication of the  notice) in parallel with 
the controls is a significant one, since the contracting authority does not have a certificate 
from the control body stating that there are no irregularities in the documents. This might 
lead to a necessity to amend the contract documents subsequently, even more than once. 
Therefore, the contracting authority is faced with a choice of uncertainty and delays caused 
by the control process. Nevertheless, it is expected that the overall time for purchases can 
be reduced for those contracting authorities that are brave enough to launch the procedure 
before the conclusion of the control procedure.
20 Government Decree No. 272/2014, ss.101–104.
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3.4. Controls integrated in the process21
Once the first part of the procurement process is complete, i.e. the time limit for submitting 
tenders has been reached, the  control process is continued with a  control integrated in 
the process. The DPPC delegates an observer to each procedure who has the right to attend 
the  meetings of the  evaluation committee and has the  right to observe all documents 
and decisions related to the procedure. At the end of the procedure, all documents have 
to be sent to the  observer who, within 10 working days, issues a  closing certificate on 
the lawfulness of the procedure.
Since 1 January 2017, the  contracting authority may award the  contract at the  same 
time as the control procedure is carried out and may also conclude the contract; however, 
the  contract cannot come into force until the  DPPC has issued a  supportive closing 
certificate. In this case, the contracting authority is faced with the same kind of dilemma 
as with ex ante controls. It has to make a decision whether to wait for the closing certificate 
from the DPPC or award and even conclude the contract in order not to delay the procedure. 
In the latter case it has to be fairly confident that everything has been carried out lawfully 
during the procedure. Otherwise it might have to repeat the award process and conclude 
the  contract with a  different economic operator. This dilemma also has a  significant 
potential to affect the decisions of the contracting authority with respect to the exclusion 
and evaluation of tenders and the  award of the  contract. Nevertheless, despite causing 
some uncertainty, the  change of the  regulation could be beneficial for the  contracting 
authority as it can speed up the process, unless of course the certificate is non-supportive 
and the contracting authority must repeat the whole or a part of the procedure.
3.5. Other control procedures
The most significant control processes that have an effect on the  public procurement 
procedure are those described in sections 3.3 and 3.4 above. Nevertheless, it must be 
highlighted that other control procedures also exist and they too have some potential of 
impacting the public procurement procedure. For public supply and public service contracts 
above the EU thresholds and public works contracts above HUF 300 million ex ante control 
is also carried out for the modification of contracts.22 Control is first carried out within 
5 working days by the  Managing Authority on eligibility, accountability and technical 
aspects, and then the  public procurement law aspects of the  modification are checked 
by the  DPPC within 13 working days from the  receipt of the  documents. If revision is 
necessary, the contracting authority has 5 working days for sending the revised documents 
to the DPPC. Any further comments by the DPPC must be sent to the contracting authority 
within 7 working days. Once the contract is amended, the amendment also has to be sent 
21 Government Decree No. 272/2014, ss.105–107.
22 Government Decree No. 272/2014, s.108.
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to the  Managing Authority who may start irregularity proceedings or a  procedure for 
remedies if it thinks that the modification is not in conformity with the  relevant rules. 
Therefore, extra care must also be taken when the contracting authority decides to modify 
an existing public procurement contract.
Contracts below the EU thresholds, in case of public supply and public service contracts 
and below HUF 300 million for public works contracts are also subject to control, but that 
other process is much simpler.23 In that case the  Managing Authority must be notified 
of the  conclusion of the  contract or the  contract amendment and must be provided 
with the  written summary of the  procedure and all other procurement documents. 
The  Managing Authority checks these within 7 working days. If any irregularities are 
found, an irregularity procedure, or in case of a breach of the public procurement rules, 
a procedure for remedies may be initiated.
In addition, general controls, for procurements funded from EU funds or national funds, 
also exist. Contract notices are controlled by the Public Procurement Authority to see if 
they conform to formal requirements and public procurement law aspects.24 However, 
the Authority may only call upon the contracting authority to correct any unlawfulness, 
but does not have the power to block the launch of procedures or the entry into force of 
the contracts. The Public Procurement Authority carries out checks on the performance 
of contracts as well. If it finds an irregularity in the performance of the contract, review 
proceedings may be initiated by the  Authority. While these are considered to be less 
significant and less rigorous than the controls carried out for EU funded procurements, 
these may also affect the way in which contracting authorities act and the decisions they 
make during the public procurement procedure.
4. DATA ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CONTROL SYSTEM
4.1. Methodology
The DPPC constantly collects data on the  issuing of the relevant certificates, which can 
form a useful basis for our analysis. In addition to the types of certificates, we have also 
obtained data from the  DPPC on the  number of cases where the  contracting authority 
issued a non-supportive certificate, which means that it did not allow the procedure to go 
ahead or continue, but following the revision of documents, a supportive certificate was 
issued with respect to the same procedure. This case means that some decision(s) had to 
be changed during the procedure, in order to have the possibility to complete it and sign 
the  contract. Furthermore, data from the  Public Procurement Authority has been used 
on the  duration of public procurement procedures from the  year 2013 until mid-2017. 
23 Government Decree No. 272/2014, ss.98–100.
24 Prime Minister’s Office Decree No. 44/2015.
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The changes in the length of procedures can therefore be contrasted with the issuing of 
certificates and the number of EU funded public procurements.
When selecting the  data, it was important to see quantitative figures on the  issuing 
of certificates to see the  volume of the  work done by the  DPPC and how many public 
procurement decisions might be affected by its activities, i.e. the  issuing of certificates. 
The numbers of supportive and non-supportive decisions was also important since it is 
the latter which has a truly significant effect on the purchases, as in this case the procedure 
has to be abandoned or re-started. The distinction between the quality control certificates 
and regularity certificates was also important, since the former has more of a preventive 
nature in that a procedure containing some irregularity is stopped before it is launched (or 
before the tenders are evaluated). On the other hand the number of regularity certificates 
indicate the  opinion of the  DPPC on the  whole conduct of the  procedure. In the  latter 
case errors are more difficult to be corrected. However, in order to see the link between 
the  issuing of certificates and the changing of the behaviour of contracting authorities, 
the number of cases where there was a change in the process having an effect of regularizing 
the procedure (i.e. making the public procurement procedure lawful) was an important 
aspect of the analysis. The number of opinions on contract amendments was also collected 
in order to see the possible difficulties faced by public authorities after the tendering phase, 
in case they had to modify the concluded contract for some reason. Finally, to put the issuing 
of certificates into the wider context, data was used from the Public Procurement Authority 
on the ratio of EU funded and nationally funded public procurements.
The data selection process was limited, however, by the data that is actually collected 
and recorded by the DPPC. As regards the time span, data on the issuing of certificates 
was available from 2012, while data on the changing of certificates was only available for 
2015 and 2016. It would have also been useful to obtain figures on the actual length of 
time it took for the DPPC to issue certificates; however, such data could not be provided 
by the DPPC. Therefore, the analysis has to be restricted to any conclusions that could be 
drawn from the limited amount of data available.
4.2. Quality control
In the 2012–2016 period, the DPPC issued the following number of supportive and non-
supportive certificates with respect to the quality control phase (ex ante):
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3,976
1,431
Suppor�ve
Non-suppor�ve
Figure 1 • Number of Quality Control Certificates 2012–201625
Table 1 • Annual breakdown of Quality Control Certificates sent out26
Year Type of quality control certificate Number
2012 supportive 837non-supportive 416
2013 supportive 1,452non-supportive 287
2014 supportive 768non-supportive 488
2015 supportive 628non-supportive 166
2016 supportive 291non-supportive 74
The data shows that when public procurement documents were subjected to ex ante 
controls in the  quality control phase, the  majority of contracting authorities received 
a green light from the DPPC. It was only in 1,431 cases within the 4-year period examined 
where the launch of the procedure was denied due to non-compliance with the relevant 
25 Source: data received from the DPPC.
26 Source: data received from the DPPC.
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legislation and principles. In these cases, the contracting authority had to change its mind 
in what to include in the contract documents or in extreme cases decide not to go ahead 
with the procurement. While there is no data on what change each of these procedures 
entailed, the  errors could relate for example to discriminatory selection criteria, award 
criteria or technical specifications. These then have to be re-thought by the contracting 
authority.
Non-supportive certificates amounted to approximately 26% of all certificates issued. 
This does not mean that errors were found in such a proportion of cases, since the figure 
concerning supportive certificates also includes those cases where a  non-supportive 
certificate was later changed to a  supportive certificate following an amendment of 
documents (see below). Therefore, the actual rate of errors could in fact be higher. In any 
case, it can be observed from the data that the DPPC has filtered out a significant number 
of errors in the control process and in many cases the existence of the controls had a direct 
impact on the conduct of public authorities. In addition, it can be supposed that the strict 
control process also had an impact on the conduct of those public authorities that received 
a  supportive certificate. First of all, the  existence of the  control system might have an 
effect in “regularizing” procedures in the first place. Secondly, in many of the procedures 
the DPPC provides comments on the procurement documents and issues the supportive 
certificates on the basis of conditions that have to be fulfilled by the contracting authority 
(e.g. amending or completing certain parts of the documents). Therefore, even in many 
of the 3,976 cases when the supportive certificate was issued, decisions had to take into 
account the opinion (or potential opinion) of the control body.
It must be remembered that prior to 2017, it was unlawful to start the  procedure 
before the  supportive quality control certificate was issued; therefore, it is possible that 
contracting authorities relied more on the decision of the DPPC to correct any mistakes 
and were less careful in their decision on what they included in the  procurement 
documents. It is submitted that in the  current regime, described above in section 3, 
contracting authorities will need to take extra care if they decide to launch the procedure 
before being in possession  of a  supportive certificates. Otherwise they will have to go 
through the inconvenience of having to modify the procurement documents and possibly 
even the conditions for participating in the tender, which in certain cases even leads to an 
obligation to prolong the time limit to submit tenders.
4.3. Regularity control
In the 2012–2016 period, the DPPC issued the following number of supportive and non-
supportive certificates with respect to the regularity phase (integrated into the process):
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3,847
171
Suppor�ve
Non-suppor�ve
Figure 2 • Number of Regularity Certificates 2012–201627
Table 2 • Annual breakdown of Regularity Certificates sent out28
Year Type of regularity certificate Number
2012 supportive 813non-supportive 27
2013 supportive 1,065non-supportive 28
2014 supportive 916non-supportive 57
2015 supportive 862non-supportive 51
2016 supportive 191non-supportive 8
It can be seen from the data that between 2012 and 2016, compliance with the law during 
the conduct of the procedure was much higher than during the quality control phase. In 
the  5-year period only 171 non-supportive regularity certificates were issued, which is 
a relatively low proportion, compared to the total number of certificates, which was 4,018. 
27 Source: data received from the DPPC.
28 Source: data received from the DPPC.
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This means that only just over 4% of the  certificates were non-supportive. Here again 
there can be a significant overlap between the two categories as in many cases supportive 
certificates might have been issued later on for procedures which initially received a non-
supportive certificate. However, even if we supposed that in all 171 cases the  issuing of 
the non-supportive certificate was followed by a supportive certificate, the rate of procedures 
with a non-supportive certificate first time round would still be only just below 4.5%.
From the above it is evident that the direct impact of the non-supportive certificates has 
been much less in the regulatory phase, as there were relatively few cases which resulted in 
a need for the contracting authority to change its decisions. There can be various explanations 
for this phenomenon. One possibility is that any irregularities had already been dealt with 
in the quality control phase and once all the documents were correct, the  likelihood of 
the contracting authority committing errors was reduced. Furthermore, as mentioned in 
section 3, the DPPC must delegate an observer to each procedure. Normally, the observer 
only controls the  documents submitted and only takes part in the  actual procedure in 
exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, the observer has the possibility to comment on 
the actions of the contracting authority, so it is likely that any potential unlawful decision is 
settled before the issuing of certificates, so in practice very few non-supportive certificates 
are issued. Still, it can be said that the control process itself has an actual impact on the way 
decisions are made during the procurement procedure.
As discussed in section 3, until the  end of 2016, the  award of the  contract could not 
be made until the  regularity certificate was issued. However, as from 1 January 2017, 
the contracting authority may decide to award and even conclude the contract, provided 
that it comes into force only when the supportive certificate by the DPPC is issued. This 
creates a  new dilemma for contracting authorities and it will be interesting to see in 
the future how this impacts on the decision-making process.
4.4. Control of contract amendments
The DPPC has also been active in controlling the  proposed amendment of contracts. 
The following table shows the number of such controls and their distribution:
Table 3 • Opinions on contract amendments and further comments 2012–201629
Lawful 2,502
Not lawful 519
Partially lawful 304
Total 3,325
29 Source: data received from the DPPC.
159
ta
nu
lm
án
yo
k •
PRO PU BL IC O B ON O – M AG YA R KÖZ IG A Z G ATÁ S •  2 017/4 .
The data shows that compared to the  number of non-supportive regularity certificates, 
the  proportion of contract amendments deemed “not lawful” by the  DPPC has been 
quite high (around 15%). If we add the  “not lawful” and “partially lawful” opinions, 
then the figure is almost 25%. This is similar to the proportion of non-supportive quality 
control certificates. This shows that while public authorities seem to take extra care during 
the conduct of the procedure, compared to the preparatory stages, at the stage of contract 
amendments they again pay less attention to the legal requirements. Therefore, the direct 
impact of the control process is also quite significant at this stage of the process.
4.5. Changes in the opinion of the DPPC
An interesting dimension of the  control process involves looking at the  number of 
cases which actually led to contracting authorities taking actions to correct any errors 
in their documents or the decisions affecting the procedure (i.e. “regularize” documents 
and decisions). The main purpose of the control process is not to punish the contracting 
authorities for any irregularities, but to help them carry out their procurements in a lawful 
way, thus avoiding any negative consequence later on both for the contracting authority 
itself (e.g. having to pay damages) and the EU Member State (e.g. financial corrections).
The number of cases where errors were corrected, so that a supportive certificate was 
issued in 2015–2016 was distributed between the types of certificate, as follows:
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191
36
Quality Control Phase
Regularity Phase
Figure 3 • Amendment of documents in a way to change a non-supportive certificate to 
a supportive certificate 2015–201630
Table 4 • Number of quality control certificates31
Year 2015 2016
Supportive 628 291
Non-supportive 166 74
Table 5 • Number of regularity control certificates32
Year 2015 2016
Supportive 862 191
Non-supportive 51 8
In addition, there was a change in the DPPC’s position from irregular/combined to regular 
in case of contract amendments in 2015–2016 in a total of 69 cases.33 It is unfortunate that 
no data is available for procedures prior to 2015.
30 Source: data received from the DPPC.
31 Source: data received from the DPPC.
32 Source: data received from the DPPC.
33 Source: data received from the DPPC.
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Using the data, our findings discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 can be confirmed, namely 
that the control process had much more direct impact on contracting authorities’  conduct 
in the quality control phase than in the regularity phase. There were only 36 occasions in 
the  regularity phase where decisions were “regularized”, which is only 16% of the  total 
number of cases when this happened. The 191 cases of changing to a supportive  certificate 
seem reasonable in the light that in 2015–2016 there were 240 non-supportive certificates. 
The  explanation for the  difference is that some contracting authorities might have 
abandoned their procurement procedures as a  result of the  non-supportive certificate. 
Nevertheless, it can be seen that in the vast majority of cases errors have been subsequently 
rectified. The ratio of rectification of errors for the regulatory phase is slightly lower, which 
shows that controls caused the contracting authorities not to complete the procedure in 
more cases than in the quality control phase.
The relatively low numbers may also be the result of contracting authorities being more 
careful about the  regularity of their procurements and now they have more experience 
about the DPPC’s approach, i.e. the types of errors which lead to issuing a non-supportive 
certificate. Therefore, in 2015–2016 the direct impact of controls were less significant than 
the possible indirect impact resulting from a “fear” of controls and the possible issuing of 
non-supportive certificates.
4.6. Length of time of public procurement procedures
It is also interesting to consider the  average length of time of public procurement 
procedures as the  control system might have impacted on this as well. Unfortunately, 
the data obtained from the Public Procurement Authority does not separate procedures 
funded from EU funds and those funded from purely national funds. However, the trend 
in the speed of conducting procedures between 2013 and the first half of 2017 can be seen 
from the following table:
Table 6 • Average duration of public procurement procedures in Hungary34
Year Average duration of procedures (days)
2013 113.15
2014 138.71
2015 156.31
2016 204.85
2017 (Q1-Q2) 212.11
34 Source: Public Procurement Authority. Data includes all procedures with a contract notice both above and 
below the public procurement thresholds. Data is based on the dates provided by contracting authorities in 
the relevant notices.
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The table shows that the duration of procedures has increased quite significantly; in fact 
the average public procurement procedure took almost twice as long in 2017 than in 2013. 
However, if we look at the  decision speed (the time between the  deadline for receiving 
tenders and the award of the contract), Hungary is still deemed acceptable by the European 
Commission’s 2017 Single Market Scoreboard (2017),35 as the length of decision-making 
was below 120 days. In this indicator Hungary did better than the Czech Republic, Ireland, 
Greece, Italy and Slovakia.
Together with this data, the changes in the proportion of EU funded procedures can 
also be contrasted. It is clear that changes in the proportion of different funding sources in 
the procurements do not affect the speed at which procurement decisions are made. While 
for example in 2016, there has been a sharp drop in the percentage of procedures financed 
from EU funds, the duration of procedures showed a significant increase.
In addition, as shown above, the number of quality control and regularity certificates has 
also decreased significantly in 2016 in line with the reduction of the number of EU funded 
procedures. This also suggests that the time taken for public procurement procedures must 
have also been affected by other factors.
Table 7 • Proportion of public procurement procedures connected to EU funds in Hungary36
Year Value of procurements Number of procedures
2012 54.1% 43.2%
2013 61.1% 50.8%
2014 49.2% 50.2%
2015 38.1% 45.9%
2016 29.9% 16.2%
Unfortunately, there is no data available on the  actual duration of control procedures 
carried out by the  DPPC. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that any of the  increase in 
the duration of the procedures would be due to an increase in the  length of the control 
process. However, it can be said that with the  process of purchasing taking longer and 
longer, controls lasting several weeks will definitely not help those contracting authorities 
who wish to carry out EU funded public procurements quickly and effectively. One must 
remember that the data on the duration only includes potentially the controls integrated 
in the process, as ex ante controls (at least until 2016) take place prior to the  launch of 
the  procedures. This means that the  actual process for higher value procedures funded 
from EU funds will be even longer.
35 Single Market Scoreboard, Performance per Policy Area: Public Procurement. (Reporting period: 01/2016– 
12/2016), European Commission, 2017.
36 Source: Public Procurement Authority.
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4.7. Discussion and recommendations
From the above it is clear that the Hungarian control system has some effect on some public 
procurement procedures co-financed by EU funds. Direct influence occurs when the result 
of the  control process leads to an actual change in the  public procurement documents, 
potentially affecting even the  final outcome of procedures, i.e. to whom the  contract is 
awarded. It can also be supposed that decisions of contracting authorities are also being 
influenced indirectly since they pay more attention to the interpretation of the rules.
It has been found that the most influence throughout the procedure occurs in the initial 
stages of the process, when the procurement documents are submitted to the DPPC. In 
the  controls integrated in the  process (regularity phase) much fewer errors have been 
found; therefore, the direct influence on the decisions of contracting authorities have been 
much less. This means that the biggest effect on the conduct of public authorities occurs, 
when they are putting the procurement documents together and setting the subject matter 
and the conditions of the procurement process.
However, the  data also shows that in fact the  majority of procurements receive 
a supportive certificate, meaning that no significant errors are found that would preclude 
permission to go ahead with the procedure. Conditions can of course be set by the DPPC 
in its decision, but the largest influence occurs when the public procurement is “blocked” 
by the DPPC and fundamental changes have to be made to the decisions of the contracting 
authority.
The table below shows the total number of EU funded public procurements in Hungary 
between 2012 and 2016. This can then be compared to the  number of non-supportive 
certificates issued by the DPPC.
Table 8 • Number of public procurement procedures connected to EU funds in Hungary37
2012 3,647
2013 6,038
2014 7,121
2015 6,482
2016 1,398
If we consider that from 2012 until 2016 there have been 24,248 procedures and in 
the 2012–2016 period in “only” 1,431 cases was a non-supportive quality control certificate 
and in 171 cases a non-supportive regularity certificate issued, then one might conclude that 
the direct influence of the control procedure only affects an insignificant number of public 
procurements. However, it must be remembered that the DPPC’s control only concerns 
higher value procurements and the data from the Public Procurement Authority includes 
37 Source: Public Procurement Authority.
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all public procurements regardless of their value. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the control of the DPPC directly affects a smaller proportion of procurement procedures, 
but these belong to the higher value categories, therefore it has a more significant effect on 
the correct use of EU funds than would appear from the data.
Despite the seemingly positive impact on the decision-making, one must not forget that 
the ex ante control system causes the public procurement procedures to be significantly 
delayed compared to a situation where no such control existed. It is notable that checking 
of notices by the  Public Procurement Authority (required also for nationally funded 
procurements), was already thought to delay the launch of the procedures,38 even though 
that is a much simpler procedure than the mandatory controls for EU funded procurements. 
Therefore it is not surprising that contracting authorities in Hungary often complain about 
the control procedures being too slow and constituting an excessive burden for them when 
carrying out their public procurements.39 The average duration of all public procurement 
procedures has increased in recent years. Although, as mentioned above, there is insufficient 
data to prove that this trend has been affected by the control process, a faster and more 
efficient control system could make the  job of contracting authorities somewhat easier. 
Further, it can be seen that even if all the deadlines set out in the  legislation were fully 
observed by the control body (which might not always be the case) it still adds a significant 
amount of time for the procedures to be completed where both ex ante control and control 
integrated in the process are used. In the light of this and the data discussed above, it is 
questionable whether such a complex procedure is really necessary, especially if errors are 
found only in a small proportion of procedures. It is also questionable whether it is really 
necessary to check all of the procedures, as this causes a burden and increases the time 
of the  procedures for every single contracting authority engaged in EU funded public 
procurement.
In light of the  number of errors occurring, it is evident that putting a  strong system 
of control for EU funded public procurements is inevitable in Hungary. Nevertheless, 
the additional time taken by the existence of the control system is not proportionate to 
the necessary interference in the decision-making of contracting authorities. Therefore, it 
would be better to have a control system, which takes more into account the necessity of 
speed and efficiency when conducting public procurements.
In the view of the authors, the Government should re-think the necessity of the current 
system and take steps to streamline the  control process. The  starting point should be 
a more in-depth analysis of the behavioural patterns of contracting authorities as a result 
of the control process. In a policy context, it could be made sure that policy-makers rely on 
38 Tátrai Tünde: A közbeszerzés jogi és hatékonysági aspektusai, Vezetéstudomány, XLI(2010)/7–8. 68–76.
39 The system applicable as from 1 January 2017 has the  aim of lessening the  delays caused by the  controls, 
however as discussed above, launching the procedure before controls are finished leads to less legal certainty 
and possible problems later on in the process.
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evidence, not assumptions, as suggested by Bavel et al.40 in their policy paper written for 
the European Commission.
Then alternative options should be explored, such as controls based on samples in 
the  way that EU projects are audited in general. The  relatively small amount of errors 
found in the control integrated into the process (regularity phase) also calls its necessity 
into question, since it seems that the vast majority of contracting authorities comply with 
the  rules, once the  procurement documents are in order. Higher value projects could 
be subjected to mandatory controls; however, it is proposed that the  thresholds above 
which this is done are increased considerably. This would allow the DPPC or any another 
competent body to focus on the most important cases only where the financial risk is larger.
A concentrating of resources on the riskiest procedures or contracting authorities with 
a poor record of compliance with the rules could also be a viable option. This would also 
be an incentive for authorities to comply, since then they would not be in the  focus of 
control bodies, resulting in a  reduction of administrative burden for them. In parallel 
the proportion of procedures subject to ex post control could be increased, which does 
not have an effect of slowing down procedures so much. It is submitted that by switching 
to a higher proportion of ex post controls the dissuasive effect of the system would not 
go away, since the  possibility of irregularity procedures and the  withdrawal of funding 
would still remain. However, contracting authorities could be incentivised to focus more 
on ensuring the legality of procedures as they would not be able to rely on certificates of 
the DPPC to ensure prior to or during the procedure that what they are doing is lawful. 
The  DPPC already provides significant guidance for contracting authorities on what 
aspects should be taken into account when preparing and conducting public procurement, 
highlighting also the most common errors that are found when preparing procedures.41 
Therefore, there is already significant help available from the control body that contracting 
authorities can rely on.
5. CONCLUSION
Hungary has established a  very strong control system for public procurements funded 
from EU-funds. This system is used for higher value procurements, while for procedures 
with a lower estimated value lighter forms of control are used. Our analysis suggests that ex 
ante controls carried out by the DPPC has an appreciable impact on the decisions of public 
authorities when designing their procedures. The controls also seem to have a similar direct 
40 René van Bavel, Benedikt Herrmann, Gabriele Esposito, Antonios Proestakis: Applying Behavioural Sci-
ences to EU Policy-making, European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technolo-
gical Studies, EUR 26033 EN, 2013. 4.
41 Deputy State Secretariat for Public Procurement Supervision, Minőségellenőrzési útmutató [Guidance on Qua-
lity Control], Prime Minister’s Office, Budapest, 2017; Deputy State Secretariat for Public Procurement Super-
vision, Szabályossági útmutató [Guidance on Regularity], Prime Minister’s Office, Budapest, 2017.
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impact on the decisions relating to the amendment of contracts. In the phase of conducting 
the procedure, public authorities tend to have a lower error rate; however, informal contacts 
with the  DPPC’s observer is also liable to considerably influence procedures. Due to 
insufficient data, it cannot be proven that the increasing duration of procedures is caused 
by delays in the control process; nevertheless, in the opinion of the authors, more efficient 
controls could be a useful step in improving the situation. Even if the deadlines set out 
in the legislation had been duly kept by the DPPC, the additional time for launching and 
completing the procedures could be quite significant.
On the positive side, the data shows that in 2015–2016 the majority of errors found by 
the DPPC have been corrected, so an initial non-supportive certificate was “turned into” 
a supportive certificate later on. While it can be established that strict controls are necessary 
in order to avoid the potential loss of EU funds, it is the view of the authors that the actual 
and potential delays caused by the procedures do not necessarily outweigh the reduction of 
risks caused by the strong influence of the contracting authorities’ decisions. The revised 
system, which has been in place since 1 January 2017, is a step in the right direction, but has 
the problem of the lack of legal certainty. So, it is hoped that further revisions will be made 
to lessen the possible negative impact of controls even further.
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